Industrieökonomik

Kursleitung

  • Prof. Dr. Gerd Muehlheusser

    • Professur für VWL, insb. Mikroökonomie mit Schwerpunkt Industrieökonomik

Kursinhalt: I Introduction

II Market Power and Monopoly

    1. Markets and Efficiency5

    1. Market Power in Consumer Markets

    • 2.1 The Basic Monopoly Model

    • 2.2 Price Discrimination

    1. Market Power in Vertical Supply Chains: Double Marginalization9

III Competition and Strategic (Firm) Interaction

    1. Price competition

    • 4.1 The Basic Bertrand Model and the Bertrand Paradox

    • 4.2 Sustaining market power: Ways out of the Bertrand Paradox

    1. Quantity Competition and Capacity Choice

    • 5.1 The Basic Cournot Model of Quantity Competition

    • 5.2 Quantity Competition with Capacity Choice: Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)

    1. Product Differentiation

    • 6.1 The Basic Framework of Product Differentiation: Hotelling (1929)

    • 6.2 Location choice without price competition

    • 6.3 Location choice in combination with price competition

IV Mergers and Cartels

    1. Cooperation Among Firms24

    1. Mergers

    • 8.1 Horizontal Mergers

    • 8.2 Vertical Mergers

    • 8.3 Case Studies

    1. Cartels

    • 9.1 Finitely Repeated Competition

    • 9.2 Cartels in the Absence of Demand Uncertainty

    • 9.3 Cartels in the Presence of Demand Uncertainty

    • 9.4 Case Studies

V Entry and Exit

    1. Contestable markets37

    1. Persistence of Market Power Even Under Free Market Entry

    • 11.1 Fixed costs of market entry

    • 11.2 Switching costs

    • 11.3 Network effects

    1. Further Strategies of Deterring Entry and Forcing Exit

    • 12.1 Limit Pricing

    • 12.2 Predation

    • 12.3 Case Study: Financial Market Predation in Sacramento TV market

VI Behavioral Industrial Organization

    1. Behavioral Economics and Industrial Organization46

    1. Consumers with Behavioral Biases47

    1. Firms with Behavioral Biases48

Most of the material covered can be found in well-known textbooks such as Tirole (2003) or Shy (1996), Cabral (2017), Martin (1994), Motta (2009), Bester (2010), or Belleflamme and Peitz (2015). Some additional references will be given throughout the lecture. You will need the game theoretic tools which you have learned in the Micro II course; useful references for refreshing your knowledge might be Gibbons (1992) or Watson (2002).

Literatur:

  • BELLEFLAMME , P., AND M. P EITZ (2015): Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies (2nd ed.). Cam- bridge University Press, Cambridge.

  • BESTER , H. (2010): Theorie der Industrieökonomik. Springer, Berlin.

  • CABRAL , L. (2017): Introduction to Industrial Organization: Second Edition. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.

  • GIBBONS , R. (1992): A Primer in Game Theory. Harvester-Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead.

  • MARTIN , S. (1994): Industrial Economics. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ.

  • MOTTA , M. (2009): Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

  • SHY, O. (1996): Industrial Organization: Theory and Applications. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.

  • TIROLE , J. (2003): The theory of industrial organization (14th print.). MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.

  • WATSON , J. (2002): Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory. WW Norton.